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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Cult of Putinality?  
The "youth for Putin" crowd is back, and this time their numbers are swelling 
thanks to the costly inducements of free pagers, movie passes, Internet access, 
and t-shirts bearing a large, smiling picture of President Putin. (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 0730 PDT, 8 May 01, and 0520 PDT, 13 May 01; via 
ClariNet) On 7 May, the anniversary of Putin's inauguration as president, a crowd 
of up to 10,000 gathered and marched to Red Square to listen to lively paeans to 
Putin and his accomplishments as president. The marchers, who carried signs 
sporting slogans like "Youth all-star team of Russia, head coach Putin V.V.," also 
received cash incentives of 500 rubles and the offer of a Crimean holiday for the 
most successful recruiters of new members from the organizers of the 
demonstration.  
 
The laudatory tone of the event prompted a YABLOKO party deputy to comment 
that a "similar demonstration could have taken place in Pyongyang in support of 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il." (AFP, 13 May 01) 
 
An apparently new organization called "Moving Together" sponsored the event 
and handed out the goodies as inducements to those who would sign up as new 
members (who, in turn, are required to pledge to renounce alcohol and respect 
one's elders). It is unclear at this point exactly who is funding Moving Together, 
but its tone is decidedly pro-Kremlin and obviously pro-Putin. The "youth for 
Putin" marchers have turned up at other events, but this is the first time the 
organizers, and their recruitment drive, have been so prominent. 
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Other hints at the developing cult of personality surrounding Putin include a new 
exhibition of portraits of the president, new books for children celebrating Putin's 
"humble beginnings," and an increasing media-driven drumbeat of national 
resurgence sparked by Putin's presidency, which, of course, highlights the level 
of state control over the media. 
 
Pavlovsky on Putin  
Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the Effective Policy Fund and a Kremlin adviser to the 
president, displayed his own take on the president's accomplishments in an 
interview with Interfax News Agency. (7 May 01; via lexis-nexis) Putin, according 
to Pavlovsky, has succeeded in ending the "continual revolutionary shocks" to 
Russia's political system and has achieved political stability. He also claims that 
Putin halted the "oligarchic control" of the media, which he describes as 
"outwardly democratic, but [with] a rather serious totalitarian filling." It's an apt 
description of many things in Russia. 
 
Pavlovsky also credits Putin with reorienting Russia's foreign policy to focus on 
Europe, working to change attitudes towards private property, and initiating 
thorough judicial reform. 
 
Putin on Putin  
At a meeting on Saturday with his representatives in the seven "super-regions" 
he created last year, President Putin declared victory, claiming that the super-
region system and the representatives he dispatched "have halted the process of 
disintegration and increased the effectiveness of the central authority." (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 12 May 01; via lexis-nexis) That, of course, was one of the 
key aims of his administration, which he articulated frequently over the course of 
the past year. (It is unclear to what extent that goal actually is being reached.) 
Putin also praised the representatives for their "constructive collaboration" with 
the regional governors, but urged them to "work more actively, more surely and 
more resolutely." In addition to the representatives, the prime minister, defense 
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and interior ministers, FSB chief and head of the Kremlin administration also 
attended the meeting. 
 
Kompromat war returns?  
Aleksandr Korzhakov, once the Kremlin's chief enforcer, has resurfaced in the 
latest battle of secret tapes in the Kremlin, and this time Aleksandr Voloshin is 
the intended target. Korzhakov claims that an anonymous man dropped off two 
CDs containing taped phone conversations from the office of the chief of the 
Kremlin administration. While the Kremlin has declined to comment on their 
authenticity, pending an investigation, they are widely believed to be genuine. 
(MOSCOW TIMES, 17 May 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
There is apparently little incriminating criminal activity recorded on the tapes, but 
they are interesting for the fawning tone and discussion of the administration's 
future plans. The tapes cover approximately one week from the end of February 
through early March and focus mostly on Voloshin's impending birthday. 
Numerous officials call in to inquire as to the proper way of congratulating him 
and there is much discussion of the elaborate gifts he receives and his 
secretaries' difficulty in dealing with the volume of flowers. Also, as The Daily 
Telegraph reported (10 May 01; via lexis-nexis), Voloshin's secretaries have an 
interesting way of referring to the president, whom they call "the great leader" 
and "the beloved one." Just sends shivers, doesn't it? 
 
In a conversation with an Izvestiya editor, Voloshin reveals the administration's 
plan to disband the Duma, "if not now then in the fall for sure." (MOSCOW 
TIMES, 17 May; via lexis-nexis) While Voloshin provides little by way of 
justification for this action, it appears to be an attempt to assert the 
administration's supremacy in Russian political life. 
 
Sergei Markov, currently foreign editor of Gleb Pavlovsky's pro-Kremlin Strana.ru 
publication, claims that the tapes seem genuine and signal that the security 
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services clique within the Kremlin is aiming to have the powerful apparat chief, 
and holdover from the Yel'tsin years, removed from office. Highlighting Voloshin's 
perhaps divided loyalties, Yel'tsin's daughter, Tatiana Dyachenko, is also 
featured prominently on the recordings; she reveals, among other things, that her 
father's illness earlier this year was more serious than was reported. 
 
Kursk funds guaranteed  
Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov has announced that the Russian 
Government guarantees that it will pay the full cost of raising the Kursk 
submarine from the Barents Sea. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 0920 PDT, 11 
May 01; via ClariNet) The Kursk, which sank in a training exercise last August, is 
set to be lifted out of the sea late this summer. Klebanov was apparently 
responding to concerns that the Kursk Foundation, an organization established 
last year to raise funds for the operation, might not reach its goal of $80 million. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
The usual suspects... 
High-visibility trials are continuing in Russia. The charge against a Krasnoyarsk 
scientist, Valentin Danilov, has been raised from "espionage" to "high treason 
through passing classified information to a foreign country." He is also accused of 
fraudulent use of funds received for this information. (ITAR-TASS, 0536 GMT, 29 
Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0429, via World News Connection) 
 
John Edward Tobin's appeal is scheduled for 25 May. If the conviction is 
confirmed, the American would begin serving his sentence six days later. It is 
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rumored that his mother, Alyce Van Etten, tried to convince her son to petition 
the Russian president for a pardon, but Tobin's lawyers oppose such a move at 
this stage, and hope to prove his innocence. (INTERFAX, 18 May 01; via lexis-
nexis) 
 
An Irkutsk court sentenced an unnamed Chinese citizen to 10 years in prison for 
espionage. Allegedly the accused had been using his position in a commercial 
firm as a cover to obtain information about Russian defense systems for China. 
(AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 21 May 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The head of the North Ossetia FSB department, Vladimir Bezugli, has accused 
40 international humanitarian organizations operating in the North Caucasus of 
harboring CIA operatives in their ranks. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 19 May 
01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Finally, the trial of Colonel Yuri Budanov, accused of murdering an 18-year-old 
Chechen girl, continues. A number of new witnesses testified, including Igor 
Grigoriev, formerly commander of an armored personnel carrier and a 
subordinate of Col. Budanov. Grigoriev testified that he and another officer 
accompanied Budanov when the young woman was arrested in her home, that 
Budanov threatened them, saying that "If someone finds out what happened here 
I have enough bullets for all of you," and that he ordered the subordinate officers 
to bury the Chechen girl's body. (ITAR-TASS, 1157 GMT, 10 May 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0510, via World News Connection) 
 
April attacks bring May malice? 
A Rossiyskaya gazeta article asserts that "the spring escalation of the [Chechen] 
gunmen's activities is being matched by equally vigorous actions on the part of 
the federal troops in Chechnya." It supports this statement by referring to Colonel 
General Valery Baranov's report that, over the last 45 days, 652 firearms, 602 
grenade launchers, and tons of explosives were confiscated, and 130 Chechen 
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"bandits" were killed (including three representatives of a well-known Muslim 
brotherhood group in the past few days alone). It alludes also to the 5 May 
action-coordination meeting in Yessentuki (Stavropol Territory) of Federal 
Security Service (FSB) Chief Nikolai Patrushev, Russian Interior Minister Boris 
Gryzlov, Presidential Envoy to the Southern Federal District Viktor Kazantsev, 
Health Minister Yuri Shevchenko, Stavropol Territory Governor Aleksandr 
Chernogorov and other local leaders. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 16 May 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0516, and ITAR-TASS, 0711 GMT, 5 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0505, via World News Connection) 
 
Various officials loyal to Moscow also have made optimistic statements. FSB 
Director Patrushev told the press that the situation in Chechnya is stable, that the 
actions of the secret services are "rather successful," and that "the current state 
of affairs in Chechnya makes it possible to neutralize the rebel leaders without 
large losses." (ITAR-TASS, 1441 GMT, 27 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0427, via 
World News Connection) Colonel Ali Muguev, deputy chief of the Chechnya 
office of the interior ministry, declared that "the gunmen are incapable of offering 
open resistance to the federal troops. They have no resources for staging major 
combat operations." (ITAR-TASS, 0732 GMT, 15 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0515, 
via World News Connection) 
 
Yet there are significant discrepancies between the numbers of victims reported 
by the Russian military chiefs and by Chechen separatist sources. During the 
latest major operation in Argun, the Russians claim, only two federal troops were 
killed and one wounded, while the Chechens say that fatalities included "dozens 
of Russian soldiers and four Chechen fighters."  
 
In addition, a controversial statement made by Grozny Mayor Bislan Gantamirov 
does not attest to a favorable situation for the federal troops. He ordered his 
subordinates to kill, on the spot, all rebels who gave the slightest indication of 
resistance, or were suspected of having killed Russians. A quick response came 
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from the newly appointed interior minister, Boris Gryzlov, who condemned 
Gantamirov's order, and from the justice ministry, which declared that the 
Russian state's war on terrorism will be waged "in strict compliance with the law 
and the principle of inevitability of punishment." Gantamirov was summoned to 
Moscow to answer for his extremist statement. (IZVESTIYA, 8 May 01; via lexis-
nexis, and ITAR-TASS, 1657 GMT, 7 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0507, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Such abuse of power and arbitrary arrests have brought about denunciations and 
protests. On 2 May, several hundred persons, including many women and older 
individuals, rallied in Alkan-Kala, southwest of Grozny, to demand the release of 
36 young men and an end to the "genocide." On 13 May, at least 100 persons, 
mostly women, demonstrated in Grozny itself. These actions come despite the 
ban on demonstrations and public gatherings. (AFP, 2 May 01; via lexis-nexis, 
and INTERFAX, 0930 GMT, 13 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0513, via World News 
Connection) Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov responded to accusations by 
saying that "the responsibility for all these barbarous actions is borne by 
terrorists' leaders and their patrons abroad." (ITAR-TASS, 1342 GMT, 17 May 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0517, via World News Connection) The Russians are trying 
also to improve their image by promising to send 28,000 Chechen children to 
recreation camps and sanatoria in the North Caucasus during the summer 
vacation. (RIA, 1241 GMT, 15 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0515, via World News 
Connection) 
 
REGIONS 
Putin and his peons 
The one-year anniversary of Putin's term in office has passed, and the 
accompanying evaluations of achievements now are focused on the first year in 
office of the presidential envoys. On Saturday, 12 May, Putin summoned his 
seven satraps to his Kremlin office to sum up their work. His words were kind. 
"The presidential envoys' activities have brought the central authorities closer to 
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the regions and that is an important result," he said. The Russian president also 
mentioned that the regional leaders had acquired "a systematic and steady 
channel of communication with the country's leadership." The main task that lies 
ahead, according to Putin, is raising the living standard of the population. "If 
these parameters grow, it will mean that we have achieved the result of pursuing 
our common goals. If not, then all the work doesn't make sense and is futile." 
(UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 12 May 01; via lexis-nexis) He also called 
on his envoys to continue working to bring regional laws in line with federal laws, 
but not to "go beyond the line where obvious prerogatives of regional leaders are 
in place." (INTERFAX, 12 May 01; via lexis-nexis)  
 
Not everyone is totally optimistic about these plenipotentiaries. The newspaper 
Izvestiya notes that "not many people have confidence in the presidential envoys, 
but even fewer distrust them -- the public simply doesn't know them." Vremya 
novosti criticizes the plenipotentiaries for being too contentious -- fighting the 
regional leaders "on legislation issues, but also on politics in general," working 
against governors (in Primoriye and in Kursk), as well as fighting the presidential 
administration and the economic bloc of the Cabinet. (WHAT THE PAPERS 
SAY, 16 May 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Finally, some regional leaders, for example President Ruslan Aushev of 
Ingushetia and Governor Mikhail Prusak of Novgorod, have determined that no 
tangible good has come of the seven-envoy institution, which they say creates a 
barrier, rather than a channel, as the bureaucracy grows out of proportion. 
(STRANA.RU, 13 May 01; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Easy come, easy go 
The bitterness of the governors should not come as a surprise, since they see 
these direct lines to the Kremlin as limiting their power. In another move to 
undercut the governors, Russian State Duma decided to cut the number of 
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Russian regions where the heads of executive power bodies can be re-elected 
for a third term from 69 to 9. This constitutes an amendment to the law passed in 
February of this year which gave presidents of certain republics the right to be re-
elected three and, in some cases, even four more times. (INTERFAX, 17 May 01; 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Media 
By Maria Metcalf 
 
Further government action spurs little reaction 
During May, it was Novaya gazeta and Ekho Moskvy's turn to face harassment. 
While the struggle for NTV went on, the average Russian was far too concerned 
with issues of everyday survival to care about the demise of independent media. 
Despite the protest marches (which were organized by NTV), the public barely 
flinched when the media coup finally did occur. Not surprisingly, there has been 
almost no popular reaction to further official actions against independent print 
and electronic media.  
 
The rest is downhill 
When, on 4 May, a Moscow court decided to award Gusinsky's 19-percent stake 
in NTV to Gazprom, it also gave Gazprom 25-percent-plus-one share in 23 other 
Media-MOST companies, including the Seven Days Publishing House, which 
produced the daily newspaper Segodnya and the weekly political magazine Itogi. 
Both Segodnya and Itogi subsequently were shut down. Another Media-MOST 
company that ended up with Gazprom as a majority shareholder was Radio Ekho 
Moskvy. All evidence seems to indicate that Ekho Moskvy, Russia's largest 
privately owned radio station, will share the fate of Segodnya and Itogi.  
 
On 10 May, investigators from the prosecutor general's office searched the radio 
station's offices, claiming that the action was related to the investigation of the 
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former first deputy general director of Aeroflot, Nikolai Glushkov. (Last 
December, Glushkov was arrested for fraud, in connection with cases involving 
several Swiss companies suspected of embezzling funds from the Russian state 
airline.) The next day, Olga Bychkova, an Ekho Moskvy host, was summoned for 
questioning regarding her interview with Glushkov's lawyer. (Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 11 May 01) 
 
There is some room for doubting the official explanation for the most recent 
search. Monitor cites Yury Fedutinov, Radio Ekho Moskvy's general director, as 
having been told that the station would be required to provide documents 
pertaining to the ongoing fraud investigation of Vladimir Gusinsky. When the first 
raid on Media-MOST offices was carried out a year ago, there were conflicting 
stories concerning the motive. In the beginning the prosecutor general's office 
claimed that the raids were due to suspicions that Media-MOST's security service 
was eavesdropping on personnel. When the raids continued, the prosecutor's 
office claimed that they were connected to a three-year-old criminal case against 
Gusinsky for allegedly embezzling state funds. Only subsequently did the 
authorities claim the raids were related to an investigation of Gusinsky on the 
charge of fraudulently taking a multimillion-dollar loan from Gazprom. 
(Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 11 May 01) 
 
Meanwhile, the journalists at Ekho Moskvy are trying to negotiate with Gazprom 
to buy back the 25-percent share lost to the state-owned company through the 4 
May court decision. The journalists currently hold a 33-percent stake in the 
station, and the additional 25-percent would allow them to maintain its 
independence. However, very recent history indicates that the odds do not favor 
the journalists. 
 
Nor are the electronic outlets the only victims of state attacks on media 
independence. Late last month the main military prosecutor's office searched the 
apartment of Valery Shiryaev, deputy general director of the biweekly newspaper 
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Novaya gazeta. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 2 May 01) With 80 percent of 
newspapers controlled by the Russian state, and 90 percent of all TV, radio 
stations and printing houses under state supervision, Novaya gazeta is one of 
the very few remaining independent sources for reliable news. In the last 24 
months, the largely employee-owned newspaper has experienced seven major 
tax inspections and 40 trials with staggering legal fees from libel suits and other 
accusations. (AMERICAN JOURNALISM REVIEW, May 01; via Johnson's 
Russia List) 
 
The battle over NTV has demonstrated the Putin government's negative 
approach to the crucial role that a free press plays in an open and democratic 
society. Ironically, this has left an oligarch, Vladimir Gusinsky, as the symbol for 
freedom of the press. It is impossible to ignore the ways in which the authorities 
are assaulting media independence in Russia. Unlike NTV, both the newspaper 
and radio station currently under attack have strong reputations worldwide for 
rising above reportage of the manipulative statements of politicians and 
oligarchs. Ekho Moskvy spent four years building its reputation, before joining 
Media MOST in 1994 when the ruble depreciated; its editorial style remained 
unchanged under Gusinsky. There is good reason to expect that Radio Ekho 
Moskvy and Novaya gazeta will fall under the thumb of the state. The NTV 
takeover could be viewed by some as ironic, but with the most recent turn of 
events on the Russian media front, the situation now is simply tragic. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
Despite rhetoric, military continues to deteriorate 
"The Russian soldiers of the new, 21st century continue to maintain the heroic 
traditions of the World War II front-line fighters by perfecting unceasingly the[ir] 
combat readiness and military skills, by accomplishing with honor the combat 
 12 
tasks set for them and persistently consolidating Russia's military security," 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated in his message commemorating 
the Great Patriotic War Victory Day celebrations. In reality, Russia's military 
apparatus continues to decay while the idea of military reform, albeit widely 
discussed, does not flourish. Just in the last three weeks, several statements and 
events have highlighted the continuing decline:  
 
* The bleeding of Russian forces continues in Chechnya. Figures released on 16 
May admitted that the defense and interior ministries have lost a substantial 
number of forces since 1 October 1999 alone -- (at least) 3,096 killed and 9,187 
wounded. (INTERFAX, 1537 GMT, 16 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0516, via World 
News Connection) These are added to the thousands killed, wounded or missing 
in previous warfare there. And while Russian public opinion of the country's 
military institution still remains high, 72% of respondents in a recent poll said that 
the conflict in Chechnya bothered them. (INTERFAX, 1314 GMT, 4 May 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0504, via World News Connection) History has shown that, 
even in authoritarian regimes, drawn-out and costly conflicts which lose popular 
support cannot be sustained (the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is a telling 
case). While not only risking the loss of public confidence, the war in Chechnya is 
draining precious resources away from the needs of the general forces and of 
successful military reform.  
 
* In the war of words over readiness, Russian Navy leadership in past months 
has expressed its concerns about material and funding problems, while calling 
for a boost in its share of the defense budget from roughly 12% to 25% per year. 
Now, the Air Force and Ground Forces commanders are staking out similar 
positions. General Anatoly Kornukov of the Air Force stated at a conference on 
Russian aviation that 100% of all Air Force helicopter and planes need 
modernization because they suffer from technical maintenance problems and 
capability shortfalls. (RIA, 1327 GMT, 16 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0516, via 
World News Connection) Additionally, he explained that only half of the aircraft 
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inventory is being flown at all and that flight time for pilot training is 
"catastrophically insufficient" due to a fuel shortages; moreover, ". . . no 
possibility of increasing the flight time" was envisaged. (INTERFAX, 1237 GMT, 
15 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0515, via World News Connection) General Nikolai 
Kormiltsev, recently shifted from the Ground Forces to a deputy defense minister 
post, echoed these sentiments of discontent concerning the Army, which in his 
words finds the "current condition of the Ground Forces difficult." (INTERFAX, 
1100 GMT, 4 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0504, via World News Connection) While 
neither Kornukov nor Kormiltsev stated specific funding figures, fixing these 
problems would require enormous resources. 
 
* Shortly after assuming command of the newly created Russian Space Troops, 
General Anatoly Perminov had to contend with the temporary loss of 
communications with several military satellites, due to a fire in a command post 
located in Serpukhov, in the Kaluga region. The cause of the fire was attributed 
to defective circuitry in a power supply. (INTERFAX, 0546 GMT, 14 May 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0514, via World News Connection) In the larger context, this 
incident was just another example of the former Soviet military machine's 
decaying infrastructure, which has been starved of proper maintenance for the 
past decade.  
 
All the while, pay and housing shortfalls for the troops persist, and local 
commanders are looking again to turn out their troops into the fields -- not for the 
training Ivanov extolled but to help bring in the harvest. On the other hand, the 
Kremlin is still pushing newer and more advanced weapon production for the 
sake of exports, demonstrating various systems at recent international arms 
shows. Foreign policy through arms sales has been a hallmark of the Putin 
leadership; thus, reinvigorating ties with former client states that can pay hard 
currency to starving Russian defense industries comes as no surprise. However, 
recent announcements that Moscow intends to resume and expand military 
technical cooperation with Libya and North Korea not only hold out little potential 
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for generating profits, they are bound to antagonize neighboring states, some 
Europeans, and, of course, the United States. Russia's "great power" status 
cannot be revived in this manner, and Putin's geopolitical games cannot be won 
through military influence when the troops are hungry and have no place to live. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Navigating the vicious circle 
Just a few days ago, it seemed that Ukraine would be facing the prospect of an 
acting prime minister, as President Leonid Kuchma and the Rada could not 
agree an a candidate to fill the fill the post on a long-term basis. Time was 
running out; the Ukrainian constitution allows only 60 days for the president and 
Rada to choose and confirm a new prime minister. "The Cabinet of Ministers," 
the document stipulates, "whose resignation is accepted by the President of 
Ukraine, continues to exercise its powers by commission of the President, until a 
newly-formed Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine commences it operation, but no 
longer than for sixty days." (Article 115) However, on 22 May, Kuchma 
nominated Anatoliy Kinakh for the premiership, and Kinakh seems to have been 
able to use his considerable power and connections to garner the support of the 
Rada's largest party, the Communists. With that, his confirmation seems 
probable.  
 
Over the previous week, Kuchma had swung back and forth between two 
candidates -- Kinakh, leader of the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (UIE), and Serhiy Tyhypko, the head of the political party Labor 
Ukraine -- before finally deciding on Kinakh. In truth, however, both Kinakh and 
Tyhypko are cut from the same cloth, and likely would govern in the same way. 
Not surprisingly, each is well connected both to Kuchma and to international 
 15 
business. Additionally, both worked vigorously to oust Viktor Yushchenko's 
cabinet, and both have deep ties to Russian business and political interests. 
Most importantly, both finalists provide a clear indication of Kuchma's style and 
policy inclinations. 
 
Kinakh in particular has worked extremely hard to integrate Ukrainian and 
Russian business interests. In May 2000, for example, he signed several 
agreements with his counterpart in the Russian UIE. One of those agreements 
called for "an active involvement of the two unions in drafting governmental 
documents regulating trade and economic relations between Ukraine and 
Russia," according to Infobank. It also emphasized "the importance of making 
mutual investments in the countries' economies, involvement in mutual projects, 
whether they are being carried out in Ukraine or Russia or a third country, and a 
regular exchange of information about such projects." (INFOBANK, 16 May 01; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Coincidentally or not, it was during this 
period that then-Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk began to be pressured 
aggressively to orient his policies more toward Russia. Soon he was replaced by 
the more pro-Russian Anatoliy Zlenko. (For further background, see 
PERSPECTIVE, Mar-Apr 2001.) 
 
Recently, Kinakh spearheaded the media barrage against Viktor Yushchenko, 
using the annual congress of UUIE members to rail against the prime minister's 
policies and call for his ouster. In particular Kinakh criticized the government for 
"losing control" of certain strategic industries, and for "overestimating the 
importance of renewed crediting by the IMF." (INFOBANK, 29 Mar 01; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) The keynote speaker during the conference -- 
President Kuchma -- expressed sympathy for the demands of the UUIE, but 
strategically stopped short of seconding the union's call for the cabinet's 
dismissal. 
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Clearly, the appointment of Kinakh will result in the stepped-up involvement of 
Ukrainian businessmen in the day-to-day activities of the government. This is the 
type of situation that always seemed to worry Viktor Yushchenko. In fact, in the 
days before Yushchenko's ouster, Tyhypko criticized the prime minister for 
rejecting his attempts at compromise. A ministerial post or two for his party was 
all it would take, Tyhypko said, to make him switch his vote. Yushchenko, 
however, refused. "Perhaps," Tyhypko told the press, "as the mass media often 
claim, . . . he does not want to soil his hands with the oligarchs." Thus, it was 
because of this refusal to provide ministerial posts that Tyhypko predicted -- and 
successfully pushed for -- Yushchenko's dismissal. (2000, 21 Apr 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Following that dismissal, the Rada splintered into three main groupings -- the 
rightist/pro-Yushchenko branch, the center-oligarch parties, and the Communists 
-- as the legislature attempted to agree on a nomination for prime minister. The 
rightists, who now include Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchina party, have refused 
to vote for any nominee as a protest against Yushchenko's dismissal. The 
centrists seem generally to support Kuchma's suggestions, and the Communists 
intend to use their support of the nominee for their own gains. Consequently, 
Ukraine seems doomed to gridlock at least for the foreseeable future. 
 
Despite Kinakh's protestations to the contrary, cash-poor Ukraine is depending 
on two financial measures to help it continue its economic growth -- resumption 
of IMF lending and rescheduling of its debt to the Paris Club. The IMF, however, 
has delayed the release of any new tranches until certain laws are passed. Such 
legislation, which would rework business enterprise zones, alter some excise 
taxes and increase privatization transparency (while, one hopes, also increasing 
privatization revenue), seemed possible under the outgoing cabinet. Now, it 
seems unlikely. Consequently, the IMF continues to delay resumption of lending. 
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The Paris Club, meanwhile, is refusing even to consider rescheduling the 
Ukrainian debt it holds until the IMF resumes funding, making long-term financial 
planning difficult for the republic. Additionally, both of these organizations have 
raised concerns about Ukraine's privatization procedures, and suggested that its 
revenue from privatization sales will fall far short of that projected in the state's 
budget. 
 
The IMF and Paris Club situations -- as well as any drop in privatization revenue 
-- negatively affect the country's ability to pay both its past and future energy bills, 
which, in turn, necessitates talk of turning over state assets to pay for gas. 
Turning over state assets -- thus further lowering projected privatization revenues 
-- would have negative impact on future IMF lending, which would have negative 
impact on Paris Club debt rescheduling, and so on, and so forth. In the short 
term, with Ukraine experiencing growth according to all of its economic 
indicators, the debt situation does not seem hobbling. In the medium to long 
term, however, it could be disastrous. 
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkmen President Saparmyrat Niyazov 
both clearly understand this point, as reflected by their actions over the last 
week. Putin nominated former PM and head of Gazprom Viktor Chernomyrdin as 
the new Russian Ambassador to Ukraine, while Niyazov announced his country's 
intention to overlook Ukraine's relatively small gas debt until Paris Club 
negotiations are complete, and signed a new agreement to supply more gas to 
its regional partner. 
 
While Ukrainian politicians cautiously welcomed Chernomyrdin's appointment, 
the move was embraced wholeheartedly by their Russian counterparts. "To bring 
such a political heavyweight as ambassador is a significant step for Russia," 
Boris Nemtsov said. A representative from a brokerage firm in Russia was even 
more thrilled. "Chernomyrdin is a very good choice. He has great contacts in 
politics, he knows how Russian-Ukrainian relations operate, and obviously knows 
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how Gazprom operates," Renaissance Capital brokerage representative Roland 
Nash told the press. "In that kind of position he will be able to cut deals and 
continue the process Gazprom has been into for the past year or so -- using 
financial muscle to gain greater economic strength in Ukraine." (THE 
INDEPENDENT PRESS, 11 May 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Nash 
did not mention, of course, that Chernomyrdin also will help Russia gain greater 
political strength in Ukraine by pressuring the country over its $1.5 billion debt to 
Gazprom and aggressively pursuing a turnover of state assets to clear that debt. 
Kinakh, who is close to Chernomyrdin, obviously will be receptive to his friend's 
suggestions. How receptive remains to be seen. 
 
Kuchma, however, at least publicly is staying true to his previous statements that 
Ukrainian state assets (in particular its gas transit system) will not be 
surrendered. "It should not be forgotten that Kyiv is now the capital of an 
independent Ukraine," he said. "The appointment of Chernomyrdin as 
ambassador should not be regarded as appointment by Moscow of a first 
secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party who will control everything." (UNIAN, 
22 May 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Nevertheless, 
Kinakh's appointment considerably undermines the force of this statement. 
 
Niyazov, for his part, has agreed that Turkmenistan will continue to increase the 
gas it supplies to Ukraine, until, by 2006, it is supplying all the gas the country 
needs. At that time, Gazprom gas theoretically will be unnecessary. The 
announcement of an impending Ukrainian-Turkmen gas agreement came 
coincidentally just days before Putin's appointment of Chernomyrdin, making the 
intentions behind this appointment even more suspect. 
 
Ukraine, therefore, is now at a crossroads. It would appear that it may have the 
opportunity to extricate itself from its dependence on Russia and begin building a 
truly independent state. It would also appear that many Ukrainian politicians -- 
who have their individual business interests at heart -- could stand in the way of 
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this happening. The actions of the Rada and the few strong reformist politicians 
in the country are likely to determine whether this is allowed to occur. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Reshuffling or rethinking? 
The near-simultaneous resignations (or removals?) of Col. Gen. Valery Baranov, 
commander of the joint army group in Chechnya, and Grozny Mayor Bislan 
Gantamirov echo a tumultuous 4 May meeting of the three power ministers -- 
Nikolai Patrushev (FSB), Sergei Ivanov (MOD), and Boris Gryzlov (MVD). On 
that occasion, military officers, MVD officials and especially Gantamirov were 
criticized thoroughly. (CHECHNYA WEEKLY, 8 May 01) That meeting followed 
clashes between military and MVD officers in Grozny on 1 May. Can it be that the 
crime, corruption, cynicism and decay in the Russian forces have reached such 
dimensions that the top officials must confront them? Are widespread rumors of 
an impending Chechen counteroffensive forcing the Russian leaders to rethink 
their strategy? These personnel changes and other signals from the authorities 
may indicate a more profound reappraisal of Russia's goals, means and posture 
vis-à-vis Chechnya. 
 
Personnel changes 
Col. Gen. Gennady Troshev, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, 
who was the commander of the Eastern group of forces during the first phase of 
the present war, has taken over temporarily for Baranov. Next week, Troshev is 
expected to cede command to Lt. Gen. Vladimir Moltenskoi, Baranov's deputy in 
charge of emergencies. After his, three-week "vacation," Baranov may fill the 
vacant position of Moscow Military District commander. (INTERFAX, 17 May 01; 
via lexis-nexis)  
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The sudden resignation of Grozny Mayor Bislan Gantamirov on 17 May has 
fueled widely divergent analyses. According to a 19 May Glasnost-Caucasus 
report, there are rumors that Gantamirov resigned because of pressure from the 
prosecutor's office, which had started proceedings against him after he issued an 
order to shoot Chechen rebels on sight. The newspaper Trud reported on 18 May 
that Gantamirov cited personality conflicts with the vice premier of the pro-
Russian Chechen government, Stanislav Il'yasov, as the main reason for his 
resignation. The government recently moved from Gudermes to Grozny against 
the wishes of the security organs. Trud also suggested that the resignation may 
not be final: Gantamirov resigned last year and was persuaded to return. Grani.ru 
on 17 May wrote that "when the local authorities abandon ship ... expect a raid 
from the Chechen fighters." 
 
Presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky indicated that the new mayor of 
Grozny will be appointed by Victor Kazantsev, the presidential representative for 
the Southern Federal District. Yakub Deniev is considered the most likely 
candidate because he replaced Gantamirov in this post in 1996 and for a short 
time was the acting head of the Chechen administration. According to 
Kazantsev's deputy, Nikolai Britvin, Gantamirov may "be invited to work for the 
office of the presidential envoy in the Southern federal district." (INTERFAX, 18 
May 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Slouching towards peace talks? 
"The trust of the Chechen population for the central authorities has not reached a 
high level," Vladimir Putin said to visiting EU officials on 18 May. (REUTERS; via 
lexis-nexis) That must be the understatement of the year. Still, it's a giant step for 
the usually upbeat Russian president to admit that something about the "counter-
terrorist operation" is less than one big hurrah. A couple of days earlier, the 
director of the FSB, which now directs the war effort, admitted that the republic 
has not been pacified fully: "All the tasks which we had to resolve certainly have 
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not been resolved and one cannot expect literally that we will resolve these tasks 
by some preset date or specified month," Nikolai Patrushev said. (RUSSIA TV; 
BBC Monitoring, via ichkeria.org)  
 
Could all this negativity signal a new willingness to commence peace talks? If 
and when the Russian president decides to undertake negotiations in earnest, 
the clearest indication will be the return to the republic of the OSCE Assistance 
Group to Chechnya. 
 
The Chechen government repeatedly and unequivocally has expressed its 
willingness to begin talks immediately. However, the Chechen side will not settle 
for another Khasavyurt treaty. This time, implementation has to be built into the 
treaty and international organizations will have to become guarantors of any 
future arrangement. (CHECHENPRESS, 15 May 01; via ichkeria.org)  
 
On 17 May following talks with the Russian president, EU foreign policy chief 
Javier Solana said "I think in a few weeks, in a few days, the mission of the 
OSCE may be returning to Chechnya." (AFP, 17 May 01; via lexis-nexis) A week 
earlier, during the Moscow visit of OSCE chairman-in-office Liviu Bota, it was 
decided to form a working group composed of officials from the justice ministry, 
the foreign ministry, and the OSCE to tackle technical and security questions 
pertaining to the redeployment of the group to Znamenskoye. This opinion finds 
support in a foreign ministry document obtained by Interfax, which says: "there 
are no political obstacles to the group's return" and "remaining details can be 
resolved routinely." However, according to the report, the group's main function 
will be "to support the federal authorities' efforts in the humanitarian sphere and 
provide tangible assistance for the soonest possible restoration of peaceful life" 
in Chechnya. (INTERFAX, 11 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0511, via World News 
Connection) 
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This is far from the first time that Russian representatives have promised to allow 
the group to carry out its work. In the past they have pledged publicly to facilitate 
its return to Chechnya but in practice created obstacles to that move. The 
conditions set out above fall far short of what the OSCE can accept, at least in 
two crucial respects: the location of the mission and its duties. It seems that 
Russian representatives again may be acting in bad faith, saying they are ready 
to work with the mission, while in fact trying to obstruct the implementation of its 
mandate.  
 
The location of the group within Chechnya constitutes a very important factor. 
The assistance group should return to Grozny. That is the site mentioned in the 
mandate, and the group operated there during the last war; it is the capital of the 
republic, and the current seat of the pro-Russian government. Most importantly, 
Grozny is a central location from which monitoring of human rights abuses can 
be conducted with relative ease. In contrast, Znamenskoye is located in the north 
of the republic far from the sites where mass graves were discovered recently. 
The village has been under Russian occupation since the very start of hostilities 
and was spared the artillery barrages and "cleansings" that have devastated 
other parts of the republic. The location of the offices of Vladimir Kalamanov, the 
president's special representative for ensuring human rights in Chechnya, 
Znamenskoye has become window dressing to distract visiting foreign 
delegations from the abuses of the war. 
 
Moreover, if the document Interfax obtained is trustworthy, the Russian side has 
rewritten the OSCE group's mandate beyond recognition. At its November 1999 
summit in Istanbul, the OSCE affirmed that the original mandate of the group 
remains in force and has not been altered. Formed in April 1995, the group was 
charged with a wide range of tasks:  
 
• promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the 
establishment of facts concerning their violation 
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• facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid  
• provide assistance to the authorities of the Russian Federation and to 
international organizations in ensuring the speediest possible return of 
refugees 
• promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization of the 
situation in the Chechen Republic in conformity with the principle of the 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and in accordance with 
OSCE principles 
• pursue dialogue and negotiations with a view to establishing a cease-fire . 
(See osce.org for the full text of the mandate.) 
 
During the last war the group was instrumental in facilitating negotiations 
between the warring sides; now, according to the version put forth by the 
Russian foreign ministry, the OSCE group's function would be limited to providing 
"support" to the federal authorities. The OSCE helped to end hostilities with the 
Khasavyurt treaty, which Tim Guldimann signed for the OSCE. The group left 
Grozny in December 1998 and has been operating from Moscow ever since.  
 
Familiar faces reappear 
Boris Berezovsky emerged from nearly a year of living in exile in relative 
obscurity to say that "the war in Chechnya should be stopped immediately and 
without any preliminary conditions." (INTERFAX, 11 May 01; via lexis-nexis) 
Berezovsky recently declared his intention to spread $10 million among 163 
Russian human rights groups.  
 
Having served as deputy secretary of the Security Council and as a Duma 
deputy from Karachevo-Cherkessia, Berezovsky has insider knowledge of 
Russian intrigue in the North Caucasus. His critics, such as Sergei Kovalev, have 
alleged that Berezovsky undermined Chechen-Russian relations by fostering the 
hostage trade and giving millions to Shamil Basaev. (PRESENTATION TO 
DAVIS CENTER, 23 Feb 00) More recently, Sergei Yastrzhembsky lashed out at 
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Berezovsky, accusing him of contributing to the causes of the war. "The anti-
terrorist operation in Chechnya would not be required if Boris Berezovsky's 
experience had not had a negative effect." (INTERFAX, 11 May 01; via lexis-
nexis)  
 
According to the Financial Times, retired General Alexander Lebed has been 
leading a peace group in Chechnya. Lebed, a major challenger to Boris Yel'tsin 
in the 1996 presidential election, was appointed Security Council secretary and 
negotiated the Khasavyurt agreements. Now the governor of Krasnoyarsk krai, 
Lebed has been heading the Peace Mission in the North Caucasus, a group 
working with Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) to promote 
reconstruction and negotiation in Chechnya. The group called on the parties to 
begin talks immediately to ward off the possibility of more intense fighting. Its 
April report pointed to alarming indicators of potential military escalation, such as 
President Putin's visit to Chechnya in April and a regrouping of Chechen forces 
near Grozny. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 10 May 01; via lexis-nexis, and 
www.fewer.org) This danger of an imminent Chechen counteroffensive may 
persuade the Russian authorities to begin talks, or so the authors of the FEWER 
report, among many other analysts, hope. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
CST countries discuss rapid reaction force  
Amid stated concern over deteriorating security on the CIS's southern borders, 
senior security officials from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
and Tajikistan met on 26-27 April in Yerevan to discuss combating terrorism in 
preparation for the planned Collective Security Treaty (CST) summit on 25 May 
in the Armenian capital.  
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Summarizing the results of the preliminary meeting, Russia's Vladimir Rushailo 
said that the CST Security Council secretaries had discussed what progress had 
been made in the formation of regional collective security systems and of 
collective rapid reaction forces for Central Asia. (ITAR-TASS, 1437 GMT, 27 Apr 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0427, via World News Connection) The Russian Security 
Council chief added that the rapid reaction forces "will be employed if need be in 
areas with complex operational situations," to repel "terrorist" attacks. 
(INTERFAX, 26 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) According to Oleg Chernov, deputy 
secretary of the Russian Security Council, the quick reaction force's main task 
will be to contain regional conflicts in Central Asia. (XINHUA, 25 Apr 01; via lexis-
nexis) The officials were reported also to have considered improving the inter-
agency coordination process within the CST itself and enhancing channels of 
communication.  
 
Central Asia has been compared to the war-torn states of Sub-Saharan Africa by 
some Western defense analysts and is in danger of becoming a "permanent war 
zone." Protracted warfare in Central Asia, presumably triggered by the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), could continue to destabilize this important 
region. (THE ANALYST, 9 May 01) Consequently, forming the rapid reaction 
force in Central Asia to counter the Islamic "threat" to Tajikistan and other Central 
Asian states is high on Russia's security agenda.  
 
Rushailo claimed that the joint rapid reaction force would benefit Tajikistan most 
of all because of its geographic location bordering Afghanistan and, more 
importantly, because the IMU is suspected of operating from bases in Tajikistan's 
Pamir mountains and may be assembling for a third campaign. (IMU incursions 
into southern Kyrgyzstan in 2000 and both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2001 
purportedly were staged from bases in northern Tajikistan.) "This is more 
pertinent for our colleagues in Tajikistan, who are the first to experience all the 
negative consequences of religious extremism and outright armed incursions 
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alike," according to the Russian Security Council chief. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 27 
Apr 01)  
 
The CIS security pact undoubtedly provides a practical framework for preserving 
Russia's military presence in post-Soviet space. With Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan ready to embrace a Russian-controlled collective security system, 
including joint rapid reaction forces in Central Asia, the stage is set for increased 
militarization of the region. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Thin line between public and private sectors, interests  
Privatization issues continue to plague the Baltic states, proving once more that 
anything can become a political football if there are enough players on both 
sides.  
 
The third attempt to sell off the Latvian Shipping Company ended in disaster, 
when no bidder made the required security deposit by the 27 April deadline. The 
failure has provided opponents of privatization, specifically the Social Democrats, 
with a weapon to wield in an attempt to bring down the economics minister and, if 
they're lucky, the government as well. Alas, the demand for Economics Minister 
Aigars Kalvitis' resignation represents once again the political tendency to kill the 
messenger. In the end, the Social Democrats' argument is not with the minister 
but with the job he was tasked to accomplish. They view the Latvian Shipping 
Company privatization as contradictory to the interests of the Latvian constitution 
and national economy. Faction chairman Egils Baldzens claims that the price 
established for the shipping company, 70 million lats (US$111,287,000) does not 
correspond to the company's actual market value, which he estimates at 200 
million lats. (BNS, 1003 GMT, 27 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0427, via World News 
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Connection) Determining market value, however, is a tricky business, as the 
prime minister's spokesman, Arnis Lapins, pointed out. The initial asking price of 
70 million lats "could not be too low because, if it was, someone would have paid 
the security deposit," Lapins said. (BNS, 1521 GMT, 27 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0427, via World News Connection)  
 
Rather than problems with pricing or the privatization process, Economic Minister 
Kalvitis cited another impediment: the political process. "The privatization 
process has been constantly accompanied by scandals and there have been 
certain political forces that have done all, used the dirtiest methods to torpedo 
and ruin the process and, unfortunately, they have attained their goal. ... In such 
an unclear investment environment as has to date developed ... it will never be 
possible to attract any potential buyers," Kalvitis said. (BNS, 1610 GMT, 27 Apr 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0427, via World News Connection)  
 
Clearly assuming that the Social Democrats eventually can be overcome, the 
government decided in mid-May to focus on the process and not the politics, and 
instructed the economics ministry to develop new terms for the Latvian Shipping 
Company's privatization. Kalvitis reported that, after serious debate, the Cabinet 
adopted the resolution unanimously, demonstrating government support for the 
principle of continuing attempts to sell the company. (BNS, 1450 GMT, 15 May 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0515, via World News Connection)  
 
Meanwhile, the Estonian Privatization Agency continues to barrel along with the 
sale of Eesti Raudtee (Estonian Rail), despite a recent court decision that 
complaints about the procedure deserved a hearing. Jaak Liivik, the director-
general of the Estonian Privatization Agency, signed a contract on 30 April with 
Baltic Rail Services -- a consortium of Estonian, British and American investors -- 
providing for the sale of a 66-percent share in Eesti Raudtee. (BNS, 1221 GMT, 
30 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0430, via World News Connection) That move 
resulted in an immediate call by the People's Union (an opposition party) for the 
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government to cancel the privatization tender, since legal proceedings to bring 
the process to a halt are underway. (BNS, 1222 GMT, 30 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-
0430, via World News Connection)  
 
According to the government's privatization program for state property in 2001, 
the agency's work is expected to end in October. That expectation, based on the 
fact that only three state-owned companies remained when the program was 
approved in March, clearly did not anticipate the problems the agency would 
have over the railroad sale. However, the original tender for the rail privatization, 
Rail Estonia, failed to bring a strategic investor by the deadline, thus clearing the 
way -- at least in Liivik's mind -- for talks with the runner-up, Baltic Rail Services. 
Not all parties are in accord over Liivik's decision, however. Rail Estonia 
successfully brought a suit in the Tallinn administrative court seeking to suspend 
the conclusion of a contract between Eesti Raudtee and Baltic Rail Services until 
Rail Estonia's complaint against the privatization agency's decision to uphold the 
deadline was heard. But timing is everything. The administrative court judge 
ruled that talks could continue. And, according to bidding documents, the agency 
could break talks and declare the privatization tender ended if the process 
extended beyond 30 April. The agency's move was slick: The Rail Estonia case 
was scheduled to be heard on 2 May. (BNS, 1031 GMT, 27 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0327, via World News Connection)  
 
As the other Baltic states are grappling with privatization problems, Lithuania 
continues to be beset by an institution politicians no doubt would love to privatize 
if only to get it out of their purview -- the Ignalina nuclear power plant. Powered 
by two Soviet-made RBMK reactors (the same folks who gave us Chernobyl), 
Ignalina has been a point of dissension between Lithuania and the international 
community for years. Unwilling to see another Chernobyl-like ecological disaster 
occur, the West has been demanding the closure of Ignalina and has used all 
leverage -- including European Union (EU) membership -- to get its way. 
Lithuania, alas, continues to rely quite heavily on the power generated by the 
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plant as well as on the employment the plant provides, and has been stalling as 
much as possible, claiming first the economic ramifications and now the social 
implications such a complete revamping of its energy policy would entail.  
 
The stalling has now moved into a new phase: preparing for a compromise. 
Economics Minister Eugenijus Gentvilas recently told reporters that the EU's 
expectation of a complete closure of Ignalina probably won't be met. International 
aid of some 200 million euros has been donated to close the plant's first reactor 
block, which is scheduled for 2005. The EU has hinted strongly that the second 
block's closure is expected to occur soon thereafter. The government decided to 
determine, by 2004, what the future of the second block would be. European 
Union representatives, on the other hand, have said that even this decision-
making process should be moved up, and that a plan should be in place by 2002. 
(BNS, 1922 GMT, 21 Mar 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0322, via World News 
Connection) Disagreements on the timing of a decision presage subsequent 
disagreements on what that decision will be. "Lithuania has its own arguments for 
not closing the second block in 2009, the year that has been indirectly suggested 
to us, but for seeking the postponement of this term. It could be the year 2012 or 
2015," Gentvilas said. However, he explained, "we must also take into account 
the arguments others make," especially since Lithuania and the EU have not yet 
begun talks on the energy chapter. (BNS, 1617 GMT, 27 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0428, via World News Connection)  
 
Repeating the same theme, Seimas speaker Arturas Paulauskas told his 
counterpart in the German Bundestag that closing down Ignalina by 2008 was 
unrealistic. According to Paulauskas' spokesperson, when Bundestag speaker 
Wolfgang Thierse noted the unacceptable use of Chernobyl-model reactors, 
Paulauskas explained that social consequences are the determining factor for 
considering the reactor's future. (BNS, 1522 GMT, 9 May 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0509, via World News Connection) Lithuania clearly is betting that the money it 
has invested to insure the plant's safety will prove sufficient in the case a similar 
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disaster occurs. It would be interesting to see, through a referendum, whether 
economics or environmental safety will reign supreme, and whether the 
Lithuanian population around the plant - where plant workers and their families 
live -- consists of bettors as well. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2001 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol6/ed0609.html. 
